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The Roots of Judicial Review in Hungary 
In 1848, during the initial phase of the Hungarian Revolution, the Parliament approved a reform package called 
“April Laws” thereby transforming the feudal-representative monarchy into a constitutional one. The aim of this 
legislation was to reform the entire legal system, and to make all necessary changes for the new economic and politi-
cal system.  
Following the suppression of the Revolution in 1849, the Habsburgs established an absolutistic regime that lasted 
until 1860. The Hungarian historical constitution was suspended, and the entire country was divided into 5 prov-
inces treated as territories of the Austrian Empire, and because of that, step-by-step the entire Austrian legal system 
was introduced in Hungary. As the international political crisis deepened in the late 1850s, Emperor Franz Joseph 
decided to restore Hungary’s constitutionality. The question was inevitable: which legal norms were in force? Were 
these the ones in use before the Revolution, the Acts made by the legislation in 1848, or the Austrian legal system as 
a whole? 
 
In 1848, during the initial phase of the Hungari-
an Revolution, the Hungarian Parliament ap-
proved a reform package called “April Laws”, 
transforming the feudal-representative monar-
chy into a constitutional one.1 The aim of this 
legislation was to reform the entire legal system, 
and to make all the necessary changes for a new 
economic and political system. Under the histor-
ical circumstances -mostly because of the tense 
political situation- the last “feudal”2 Diet only 
had the opportunity to amend the most urgent 
Acts; which is why the April Laws could not be 
considered as a whole Constitution.3 The adop-
tion of these Acts, which passed the vote in both 
houses of the legislative assembly, and were 
granted the royal assent to by King Ferdi-
                        
1 ECKHART, Magyar alkotmány- és jogtörténet 418. 
2 This phrase indicates – in the Hungarian legal histo-
ry – the era between 1000 (the foundation of the 
Christian state) and 1848, when the revolution took 
place. See: MEZEY, Magyar jogtörténet 10. 
3 MEZEY, Magyar alkotmánytörténet 244–245. 
nand V.4,5 could be characterized as a reform – 
from a strictly legal perspective – even if the 
events that followed during 1848–1849 have 
ultimately led to a revolution and a war for in-
dependence. 
These laws, in essence, set up the following sys-
tem: a Hungarian government shall be estab-
lished which was to be responsible to the Par-
liament in Budapest; said Parliament – based on 
popular representation – was to replace the feu-
dal Diet previously seated in Pressburg. The 
suffrage was based on wealth and certain basic 
rights; among them the freedom of the press, 
were also guaranteed. The biggest change in the 
economic system was the abolishment of the 
nobility’s tax exemption. Feudalism ended by 
abolishing the so-called robot – that is the labor 
owed by the serfs to their landlords.6 A law 
made it obligatory to liberate all serfs; and enti-
                        
4 Also called Emperor Ferdinand I. of Austria. 
5 ECKHART, Magyar alkotmány- és jogtörténet 420. 
6 MEZEY, Magyar alkotmánytörténet 246–247. 
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tle them to land ownership - whilst imposing a 
duty on the state to compensate the landowners.  
Some of the legal norms found in the April Laws 
(mostly the ones regarding the field of civil law) 
could be described as provisional and/or declar-
ative.7 A good example for that is the law8 that 
ordered the newly formed national assembly to 
adopt a new Civil Code, which would no longer 
have been based on the entailment - the most 
important legal institution characteristic of the 
medieval Hungarian civil law that substantially 
restricted the alienation of the land owned by 
nobilities. The roots of this legal institution can 
be found already in those rules and regulations 
that existed prior to the Hungarian settlement.9 
The purpose of the entailment was to protect the 
unity of the property belonging to one (noble) 
clan. Since all relatives of the landholder were 
entitled to inherit the estate, their prior consent 
was required for its alienation in whole or in 
part. The challenges involved for the individual 
landholder in obtaining this consent – particu-
larly from distant cousins, minors and unborn – 
made it almost impossible to ensure that any 
transaction was successful. Any of the relatives 
could challenge such actions and render it void 
through his or her protest.10 In addition, the 
neighbors also had the right of preemption, and 
even the King had to approve such transactions. 
This is why by the 19th century it had already 
become one of the greatest obstacles blocking 
the economic changes.  
During the Spring of 1848, the abolishment of 
entailment was of highest priority but the legis-
lators were well aware that the adoption of a 
new Civil Code (that would have changed the 
very foundations of the entire Hungarian civil 
law) could not happen overnight. This is why 
                        
7 MEZEY, Magyar jogtörténet 156. 
8 See: Act Nr. 15 of 1848 
9 TARJÁN, Nagy Lajos király kihirdeti az siség tör-
vényét 
10 MEZEY, Magyar jogtörténet 98. 
the April Laws only stated the theory that en-
tailment was to be abolished, and left it to the 
new Parliament to adopt the Civil Code that 
would have detailed its practical realization. For 
the time being, a juridical recess was ordered in 
all cases affected by this change. This was also 
supported by the politicians, who thought that 
the Parliament – which would have convened 
after the democratic elections – should have 
decided on such issues.11 The new democratic 
Parliament however, never got the chance to 
adopt these laws. In September of 1848, after 
successfully suppressing the uprisings in the 
entire Habsburg Empire except Hungary, King 
Ferdinand V. began to question the validity of 
the April Laws. Ferdinand V. wanted to dissolve 
the Parliament and appoint a new cabinet, 
which is why he refused to participate in the 
lawmaking from then on.12 A month later, the 
war for independence broke out between Hun-
gary and the Habsburgs.13 In December 1848, 
King Ferdinand V. abdicated the throne to allow 
his nephew, Franz Joseph to succeed him. How-
ever, according to the Hungarian laws,14 the 
King should have asked for the affirmation of 
the Parliament to make such an action, there-
fore, the rule of Franz Joseph was not formally 
accepted until 1867.15 
The situation became even more complicated 
following the suppression of the Revolution in 
August 1849, when the Habsburgs established 
an absolutistic regime that lasted until 1860. The 
Hungarian historical constitution was suspend-
ed, and the entire country was divided into five 
                        
11 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 52. 
12 ECKHART, Magyar alkotmány– és jogtörténet 422. 
13 N.b.: the word ’independence’ refers to the Hungar-
ians’ aim to preserve their rights in the Habsburg 
Empire and does not include a will to separate from 
it. See: MEZEY, Magyar alkotmánytörténet 246. 
14 BEKE-MARTOS, Az Osztrák Császárság 101. 
15 See: BEKE-MARTOS, Állami legitimációs eljárások 64–
73. 
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provinces treated as territories of the Austrian 
Empire.16 The Parliament was dissolved, so were 
the municipalities, and the courts were newly 
organized on the grounds of the Austrian mod-
el.17 Though the Viennese government support-
ed the economic transition, it consequently de-
nied the acceptance of the April Laws, which 
served as the basis of the constitutional monar-
chy and paved the way towards the modern 
capitalistic regime.18 Nevertheless, even if they 
had accepted these laws, the main problem 
would have remained: the laws, that would 
have allowed the definitive transformation, had 
not yet been adopted.  
After the suspension of the Hungarian historical 
constitution one of the main goals of the Austri-
an government was the unification of the legal 
system. Therefore, the Austrian Criminal Code 
replaced the Hungarian medieval criminal laws, 
and the Austrian rules of procedure were intro-
duced also. The biggest problem was that with 
the abolishment of the entailment, practically no 
applicable civil laws remained.19 The legislation 
of 1848 granted a juridical recess regarding all 
affected cases, but this solution was not sustain-
able for a longer period. 20 In addition, the abol-
ishment of entailment also brought about the 
disestablishment of a regulated line of inher-
itance, so it became inevitable to address this 
issue. The emperor issued the letters patent in 
1852, which abolished the barriers of alienating 
property, and also put an end to the distinction 
between the regulation of lands owned by nobil-
ities or non-noble individuals.21  
In 1853 the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB) came 
into effect in Hungary, so step by step the entire 
                        
16 MEZEY, Magyar alkotmánytörténet 253–255. 
17 MEZEY, Magyar alkotmánytörténet 428. 
18 MEZEY, Horváth Boldizsár az országbírói 
értekezleten 33. 
19 KECSKEMÉTHY, Vázlatok egy év történetébl 26. 
20 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 34. 
21 MEZEY, Magyar jogtörténet 157. 
Austrian legal system was introduced. A situa-
tion like this wasn’t entirely unprecedented, 
because under the rule of Joseph II. something 
similar had already happened: he refused to be 
crowned the King of Hungary, because he did 
not want to be bound by the Hungarian Laws, 
which in his interpretation would have entitled 
him to change laws without the consent of the 
Parliament. Between 1780 and 1790, only the 
organization of the courts and the rules of pro-
ceedings were changed. In contrast, the changes 
after 1849 were much more substantial. Some of 
these legal norms (particularly in the area of 
civil law) were much more advanced than their 
former Hungarian counterparts. They have even 
introduced new legal institutions, like the mod-
ern land register, which has not existed at all 
before 1855. The citizens started to enter into 
their contracts and prepare their last wills ac-
cording to these regulations, and the judges 
were forced to base their rulings on these laws.  
As the international political crisis deepened in 
the late 1850s, Emperor Franz Joseph decided to 
restore Hungary’s constitutionality. He issued a 
new constitution, the October Diploma, in 1860. 
This stated that every former Hungarian state 
organization (including the Parliament, the mu-
nicipalities, and the courts) should be restored, 
but it did not say anything about the applicable 
law.22 The question, however, was inevitable: 
which legal norms were in force? Were these the 
ones in use before the Revolution, the Acts made 
by the legislation in 1848, or the Austrian legal 
system as a whole? 
The emperor first attempted to answer this ques-
tion when he decided to convene the Parliament. 
In his ordinance he specifically stated that ac-
cording to his intentions, only a few Acts of the 
April Laws would remain in effect (like the one 
that abolished the fiscal immunity of noblemen). 
This document was sent to the Judex Curiae (the 
                        
22 SZABAD, Forradalom és kiegyezés válaszútján 160. 
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Presiding Judge of the newly reorganized Hun-
garian Royal Curia – the highest ranking Court 
in the country), who was also ordered to organ-
ize a debate over the “organization of the adju-
dication”.23 The emperor declared that every 
Austrian Act should remain in effect until the 
(Hungarian) Parliament changes them.24 
To fulfill this request, a Commission was orga-
nized in 1861, the members of which were high-
ranking judges and lawyers. The official duty of 
this forum was to decide on the “organization of 
the adjudication” but the content of this term 
was strongly debated.25 The narrow interpreta-
tion would have only meant a proposal for the 
reorganization of the court system;26 while the 
broader content would have also entailed the 
validity-evaluation of all Austrian laws which 
had previously entered into force. The situation 
was getting more complicated by every passing 
day, because most of the municipalities declared 
the Austrian laws unconstitutional,27 and their 
newly reorganized courts started to base their 
rulings upon the old Hungarian laws.28 For the 
Habsburg-regime however, this was completely 
unacceptable since it only recognized laws used 
before the Revolution. 
The starting point for the Commission was to 
return to the state of April 1848. There were a 
few problems stemming from the laws used 
before Revolution, for example, differentiated 
between noblemen and serfs – both in criminal 
and the civil laws. It seemed impossible for the 
most part to revert to these laws without sub-
stantial changes. Certain members thought this 
                        
23 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 1. 
24 KECSKEMÉTHY, Vázlatok egy év történetébl 64. 
25 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 8. 
26 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 16. 
27 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 5. 
28 SZABAD, Forradalom és kiegyezés válaszútján 160. 
an easily solvable issue; because the regulations 
which had previously related to noblemen could 
have been applied to the emancipated serfs as 
well (this idea had already been used in the rev-
olution of 1848).29 Another problem was that the 
abolishment of entailment also eliminated the 
basis of the medieval civil law. If the Commis-
sion, or later the Parliament had returned to this 
stage of legal development where the feudal law 
no longer existed but no new system had been 
developed, the judges would have received dis-
cretionary powers in most cases due to the lack 
of applicable law. Some suggested that the ex-
tension of the juridical recess imposed in the 
April Laws would have solved this conflict, not 
many supported this however. 
The biggest obstacle nevertheless, was that the 
Austrian legal norms which had already been in 
effect for over 10 years in 1860, have introduced 
many important legal institutions, (for example 
the modern land registry in 1855), that had not 
existed in the medieval law, and the annulment 
of which would have caused an economic disas-
ter. This seemingly left two possible options 
open: the Commission could have advised the 
Parliament to acknowledge the Austrian laws as 
being constitutional, or could have pushed for a 
return to the state of 1848, ignoring all the 
drawbacks mentioned earlier. The prior option 
was completely unacceptable for political and 
professional reasons alike. (It has been cited for 
example that the Austrian Criminal Code was 
too harsh, and the judicial processes took more 
time based on the Austrian rules of procedure.)30 
The latter option was also problematic which is 
why some members of the Commission opted 
for a third solution, a compromise between these 
two. 
                        
29 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 13–18. 
30 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 38–40. 
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The members aiming for the third option argued 
that a distinction shall be made between public 
and private law. In the prior field it would have 
been unacceptable to let any Austrian laws re-
main in effect, because everything that hap-
pened before 1849 had been forced upon the 
country and had therefore been unconstitution-
al. Whenever there was a revolution, it was the 
normal reaction that the public law followed the 
changes in the political system.31 After the sup-
pression of the 1848–1849 Revolution, the Habs-
burg forced their constitution on Hungary, cre-
ating an absolutistic regime - which is why eve-
ryone should have opposed anything that 
would have been less than the return to the basis 
of the April Laws. In the field of private law 
however, these rules could not be applied in the 
same way. 
Both Ferenc Deák, and Boldizsár Horváth32 ar-
gued, that the main goal and principle of civil 
law is to protect the rights of the individuals, so 
they must be cautious with this issue.33 They 
said that all of those legal relations that had 
originated from the basis of the Austrian legal 
norms should then, in effect, have been evaluat-
ed and judged on those bases. In addition they 
claimed that until the Parliament would be ca-
pable of making laws, certain Austrian legal 
norms should be kept in effect, because their 
abolishment would be for the disadvantage of 
the individuals. (This could happen because 
both the October Diploma and the February 
Patent treated Transylvania and Croatia as sepa-
rate countries34 and the legislators did not want 
to adopt any laws until the integrity of Hungary 
has been completely restored.) 
                        
31 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 32–33. 
32 For more information see: KENYERES, Magyar Életra-
jzi Lexikon 
33 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 33–36. 
34 ECKHART, Magyar alkotmány- és jogtörténet 427. 
The advocates of the compromise thought that 
legal security was just as valuable a principle as 
that of legality, and therefore, if they restored 
the state of 1848, such an action would be un-
constitutional because it would create a jurisdic-
tional anarchy.35 What they could not have 
known was that the Parliament has only started 
to exercise its right to adopt new laws from 
1867, when the Austro-Hungarian Compromise 
consolidated the relations between Austria, 
Hungary and the Habsburgs. That also meant 
that six years had passed without any result in 
lawmaking.36  
In its proposal, the Commission wrote that the 
Hungarian civil laws should be applied - but in 
those cases where they would not be applicable 
(e.g. the Act abolishing the entailment) the 
courts should base their judgments on the tran-
sitory rules set up by the Commission for such 
purposes. This collection was called the Transi-
tional Rules of Adjudication, and its proposi-
tions could be divided into three main catego-
ries: in some cases they introduced the old Hun-
garian legal norms (that was the case with the 
Bankruptcy Act or with the criminal laws), in 
other cases they modified the former Hungarian 
laws (like in law of succession or of family law), 
and – perhaps most importantly – they 
acknowledged that some of the Austrian legal 
norms should stay in force (like the ones intro-
ducing the land register, and resolving the legal 
relations between the noblemen and their for-
mer serfs).  
Following the issuance of the Commission’s 
proposal, a Committee was established by the 
House of Representatives, which proposed to 
accept these transitional rules without changes. 
After a debate, the representatives adopted it, as 
did the House of Lords. A few days later, the 
Hungarian Royal Curia ordered the courts to 
                        
35 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 34. 
36 MEZEY, Magyar jogtörténet 158. 
 Imre KEPÉSSY 444
base their rulings on the basis of said rules.37 As 
a consequence, many Austrian legal norms re-
mained in effect, thanks to the judges, who 
based their decisions in civil law cases on the 
Austrian Civil Code, when they could not find 
any applicable laws. In my opinion, the Com-
mission made a wise decision – even if that 
seemed the only real option.  
Conclusion: 
The most important (and so far left unanswered) 
question regarding the Commission of 1861 was  
exactly what this forum conducted as an activi-
ty; a Commission, whose status was hard to 
determine from a constitutional law perspective. 
It received its mandate from the King, who or-
dered the members to discuss the organization 
of adjudication and make recommendations 
relating thereto.38 Among the members was the 
Judex Curiae, who was the Chief Justice of Hun-
gary at that time, and the appointed judges of 
the Hungarian Royal Curia as well as other in-
vited individuals, mainly lawyers and legal 
scholars. The fact that only the 60 most reputa-
ble lawyers of the country were invited to the 
Commission shows its real significance.39  
During the sessions, the members argued about 
two main issues: the organization of a court 
system (including the Curia) that should be set 
up, and about the law that these courts should 
apply. Regarding the first matter, the court sys-
tem that had existed prior to 1848 was restored 
based on the recommendation of the Commis-
sion.40 The members decided similarly regarding 
the validity – or more precisely the constitution-
ality – of the Austrian laws: they deemed the 
                        
37 MEZEY, Magyar jogtörténet 159. 
38 KECSKEMÉTHY, Vázlatok egy év történetébl 63–64. 
39 MEZEY, Horváth Boldizsár az országbírói 
értekezleten 33. 
40 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 60–61. 
state of 1848 as the standard.41 The reason for 
this decision was that according to the laws of 
1790/1791 – that summarized the most im-
portant rules of the feudal constitution – the 
King was entitled to legislate but only together 
with the Parliament, and he could only issue 
decrees (letters patents) with content that was in 
accordance with the Acts.42 After 1850, the 
Viennese government however, introduced Acts 
and Codes foreign to the Hungarian legal tradi-
tions in an absolutistic manner (that is without 
calling the Parliament together).43 Such a severe 
breach of the legislative procedure would today 
be deemed void from a public law perspective, 
and according to the practice of the Constitu-
tional Court, it would surely lead to the nullifi-
cation of the law.44 Because of this role, we are 
here facing an organ that acted with the authori-
ty of judicial review,45 that evaluated the consti-
tutionality of the laws based on the (historical) 
constitution’s regulation on the legislative pro-
cess.  
Regarding those (Austrian) laws of which the 
validity was maintained temporarily, the mem-
bers supported their action with legal security 
and the need to provide the security of the 
property and ownership of the private individu-
als. The Constitutional Court, even today, often 
uses the tool of setting a moratorium for the 
Parliament in order to have it change the uncon-
stitutional norm and guarantee legal security.46  
We nevertheless need to take into consideration 
that the Commission did not exclusively act as a 
“negative” legislative forum, since apart from 
                        
41 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 58. 
42 See: Act Nr. 12 of 1790/1791 
43 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 11, 20. 
44 KUKORELLI, Alkotmányjog 111–113. 
45 SZABÓ, Jogállami forradalom és a büntetjog alkot-
mányos legitimitása 
46 SÓLYOM, Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Ma-
gyarországon 376–377. 
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rendering the Austrian laws ineffective, it more 
than once also amended those rules and regula-
tions. When it comes to a forum exercising the 
authority of judicial review no positive legisla-
tion is possible since that would mean taking 
over the duties of the legislature. In my opinion, 
however, and taking the historic circumstances 
into consideration, it is understandable why this 
Commission could and did amend the existing 
laws, because only the uncertainty was palpable 
surrounding the convening and operation of the 
Parliament and without an adequate reorganiza-
tion of the laws a jurisdictional anarchy could 
have easily come about in the country.47 This is 
why the Commission first modernized the con-
tent of the earlier Hungarian laws (e.g. they 
eliminated the differences between noble and 
non-noble individuals which can be seen as ad-
herence to a constitutional requirement), and 
they have also redrafted those parts of the Aus-
trian laws that were not in compliance with the 
Hungarian legal traditions. During the debates, 
the question of what the mandate of the Com-
mission includes has been repeatedly raised, 
and the members have often emphasized that 
legislation was the duty of the Parliament which 
they could not take over. 
Based on its activity, I believe, that the Commis-
sion was a forum with the authority of judicial 
review and can therefore be considered as a 
predecessor of a constitutional court. It acted, on 
the one hand, as a control over the executive 
power, which had aimed at solving the above 
mentioned issue by upholding the validity of the 
Austrian laws. On the other hand, the fact that 
this forum debated the relationship of the Hun-
garian and Austrian laws with a consequent 
consideration for the principles of legal security 
and legality proves that the roots of the Hungar-
                        
47 RÁTH, Az országbírói értekezlet a törvénykezés 
tárgyában 34. 
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